The Weimar Republic 1919–1933

Mark Scheme (2 inferences × 2 marks each = 4 marks total)

Inference 1 (2 marks): I can infer that left-wing groups posed a serious and immediate threat to the new Weimar Republic. Supporting detail from source: Ebert's use of urgent, alarm-filled language ("destroying the revolution," "chaos and ruin") suggests the Spartacist threat was considered severe enough to require emergency public mobilisation — he would not use such rhetoric for a minor or easily contained problem.

Inference 2 (2 marks): I can infer that the government was prepared to use extraordinary measures — including violence — to protect the republic. Supporting detail from source: Ebert's call on "every German" to stand against the Spartacists "whatever it takes" implies he was building public consent for a forceful response, which we know meant deploying the Freikorps paramilitary units and resulted in the murder of Luxemburg and Liebknecht.

Award 1 mark for each valid inference and 1 mark for each supporting detail from the source. Do not accept general knowledge about the Spartacists without source support.

Mark Scheme (Levels 1–4)

Level 4 (7–8 marks): Analyses the utility of both sources by examining their NOP; makes a judgement about their relative usefulness for the specific enquiry; integrates own contextual knowledge to support or contextualise; evaluates limitations but explains why the sources remain useful despite them. Uses precise historical detail.

Level 3 (5–6 marks): Examines utility of both sources with reference to NOP and own knowledge; evaluates limitations; makes an overall judgement.

Sample Level 4 response extract:

"Source A is useful for studying left-wing threats to the early republic because it provides direct evidence of how the government responded to the Spartacist uprising — with propaganda designed to justify violent suppression. Its nature as a political speech makes it particularly valuable for understanding the government's perspective and its public communication strategy: Ebert's language reveals that he felt it necessary to frame the Freikorps response as a defence of the revolution rather than an attack on the workers' movement. The source's limitation — Ebert's obvious vested interest in exaggerating the communist threat — does not diminish its utility but redirects it: his bias is itself evidence of how precarious the republic's position was.

Source B complements Source A by providing evidence of a different and arguably more severe long-term threat — economic instability. The photograph's origin in a Berlin newspaper at the peak of hyperinflation in November 1923 means it captures the lived experience of the crisis that destroyed the middle class's savings and trust in democratic government. Its limitation as a potentially staged press photograph means it cannot be taken as a literal documentary record; but its message is consistent with extensive other evidence about the scale of the 1923 crisis, and its publication in a mainstream newspaper suggests editors believed readers would recognise the scene as truthful to their experience. Together, the two sources illustrate that the threats to Weimar 1919–23 were both political (communist revolution from the left) and economic (hyperinflation), and that the government's own responses to those threats sometimes created further problems."

Mark Scheme (Levels 1–3)

Level 3 (7–8 marks): Analyses the significance of individual events and explains how they are linked as a developing story with clear causation; demonstrates understanding of turning points; well-chosen and accurate factual detail; shows how Germany moved from crisis to recovery.

Key events to include and link:

1. Ruhr occupation (January 1923): France and Belgium invaded Germany's industrial heartland when Germany fell behind on reparations payments. This was the trigger for everything that followed — the government in Berlin ordered passive resistance, which required funding from a printing press.

2. Hyperinflation (throughout 1923): Printing money to fund passive resistance caused catastrophic inflation. By November 1923 a loaf of bread cost 200 billion marks. The middle class — who had savings in German currency — were financially destroyed. This economic collapse created the political instability that extremists could exploit.

3. Munich Putsch (8–9 November 1923): Hitler, believing the republic was at its most vulnerable, launched a coup in Munich. His 2,000 SA men seized a beer hall, declared revolution, and marched into the city. Police opened fire; 16 Nazis were killed and Hitler was arrested. The putsch's failure at the moment of maximum republican weakness actually demonstrated a residual resilience in the republic's institutions.

4. Stresemann's response (August–November 1923): Appointed Chancellor in August, Stresemann made the politically risky decision to end passive resistance in September — widely condemned as surrender. He then introduced the Rentenmark in November, a new currency backed by land, which almost immediately ended hyperinflation. This linked the crisis to its resolution: Stresemann's pragmatism in accepting short-term unpopularity to achieve long-term stability.

Linking sentence: The events of 1923 form a chain in which one crisis (French occupation) triggered another (hyperinflation), which created the conditions for a third (the Munich Putsch), but Stresemann's decisive economic and political judgement broke the cycle and set the stage for the Golden Years — showing that the republic's survival was not inevitable but depended on individual leadership.

Mark Scheme (Levels 1–4, up to 16 marks + 4 SPaG)

Level 4 (13–16 marks): Sustained analysis of multiple factors with well-supported argument about their relative importance; own knowledge that extends clearly beyond the stimulus material; explicit, developed judgement on whether the Great Depression was the main reason; considers how factors interacted.

Essay structure:

Argument FOR Great Depression as main reason:
The Wall Street Crash of October 1929 had immediate and catastrophic consequences for Germany. US banks recalled short-term loans that underpinned the entire German economic recovery built by Stresemann — businesses collapsed, unemployment rose from 1.3 million to 6 million by 1932. The coalition government could not agree on economic policy and fell in March 1930. Chancellor Brüning's austerity cuts deepened the misery and alienated voters. In these conditions, the Nazi Party grew from 12 Reichstag seats in 1928 to 230 in July 1932. Without the Depression, Hitler's movement had been in decline — this suggests the Depression was the decisive factor. Stresemann's "dance on a volcano" metaphor proved prophetic: the recovery was built entirely on American money.

Argument — Weimar Constitution as factor:
However, the republic's structural weaknesses predated the Depression by a decade. Proportional representation produced perpetual coalition instability — nine governments between 1919 and 1923 alone. Article 48 had been used increasingly frequently even before 1929 to bypass the Reichstag. The conservative establishment — army officers, judges, civil servants — had never accepted the republic and were willing to conspire against it when opportunity arose. These weaknesses meant that when the Depression struck, the republic had no institutional resilience to fall back on.

Argument — Hyperinflation 1923 as factor:
The psychological damage of hyperinflation should not be underestimated. The destruction of middle-class savings in 1923 created a generation with a deep distrust of democratic government's ability to manage the economy. When the Depression struck in 1929 and memories of 1923 revived, the same middle class that had survived hyperinflation turned to the Nazis — who promised economic competence and national strength.

Own knowledge beyond stimulus:
The final collapse also required specific political decisions in January 1933 that were not economically determined. Hindenburg had refused to appoint Hitler twice in 1932. It was Franz von Papen's miscalculation — persuading Hindenburg that Hitler could be "controlled" in a coalition — that actually transferred power. The Depression created the political crisis; conservative elites created the specific outcome.

Conclusion (Grade 9):
The Great Depression was the most important single factor because it transformed a fragile but functioning democracy into a political crisis from which the republic could not recover. However, it was not sufficient on its own. The republic's constitutional weaknesses, the psychological legacy of hyperinflation, the hostility of conservative elites, and the specific political decisions of January 1933 all contributed. The Depression was the trigger that fired the weapon — but the weapon had been loaded since 1919.