The League of Nations in the 1930s

Inference 1: The League had failed to protect Abyssinia from Italian aggression. I can infer this from the detail that Selassie asks "What answer shall I take back to my people?" — implying his people are suffering and have received no help from the League despite appealing for it.

Inference 2: The League's failure to act would encourage further aggression by other nations. I can infer this from the detail "It will be you tomorrow" — Selassie is warning that the League's inaction over Abyssinia sets a precedent that other nations will exploit, suggesting he believes the League's failure has destroyed the principle of collective security.

Mark scheme: 1 mark for each valid inference + 1 mark for supporting detail from source = 2 × 2 marks = 4 marks.

Mark Scheme (8 marks):

Level 4 (7–8 marks): Analyses both sources' utility using Nature, Origin, Purpose and contextual knowledge. Explains why utility is enhanced and/or limited for the specific enquiry. Reaches a supported judgement on how useful each source is.

Level 3 (5–6 marks): Explains the utility of both sources with some reference to NOP or contextual knowledge. May lack full analysis of limitations.

Level 2 (3–4 marks): Describes what sources show; some comment on usefulness. Limited use of NOP.

Level 1 (1–2 marks): Simple comments on content only.

Grade 9 Model Approach: Source A is useful for understanding the moral failure of collective security and how the crisis appeared to its victim — Selassie was the most directly affected party, speaking from Geneva in June 1936 after the conquest was complete. The purpose (to shame League members and appeal for help) does not undermine its utility because his description of the League's inaction is accurate — the purpose explains why he framed it as he did. However, it cannot explain the strategic calculations of Britain and France. Source B is useful for understanding the immediate British political reaction to the Hoare-Laval Pact. As an opposition MP's speech, Sinclair's condemnation of it as "betrayal" reflects genuine public outrage, not just partisan point-scoring — the fact that Hoare was forced to resign confirms the pact was politically toxic. Together the sources are more useful in combination: Source A shows the external victim's perspective; Source B shows the internal British reaction to the key moment of betrayal.

Mark Scheme (8 marks): Level 4 (7–8): Sustained analytical narrative with causal links; three or more events sequenced with explanation of how each led to the next; clear focus on why credibility was destroyed.

Grade 9 Model Answer:

The Abyssinian Crisis began in October 1935 when Mussolini ordered the Italian invasion of Abyssinia, exploiting a border dispute at Wal Wal as a pretext. This immediately put the League in a critical position: Abyssinia was a League member, and Italy — a permanent Council member — was committing clear aggression. The League's initial response appeared decisive: economic sanctions were imposed on Italy within weeks, banning arms sales and some imports. However, this swift appearance masked a fatal hesitation, because the sanctions excluded oil — the most essential commodity for Italy's military campaign. Britain controlled the Suez Canal and could have blocked Italian supply lines, but refused to do so for fear of pushing Mussolini towards Hitler. The sanctions therefore gave the impression of action while allowing the invasion to continue.

The crisis reached a new low in December 1935 with the revelation of the Hoare-Laval Pact. British Foreign Secretary Hoare and French Prime Minister Laval had secretly agreed to give Mussolini two-thirds of Abyssinia in exchange for a ceasefire. When this was leaked to the French press, British public opinion was outraged: the government had publicly championed the League while secretly betraying its most fundamental principle. Hoare was forced to resign, but the damage was done — the world could see that Britain and France cared more about keeping Italy as an ally against Hitler than about upholding international law. The pact's abandonment, paradoxically, made things worse: Mussolini was now furious with Britain and France but had gained nothing, making him more receptive to Hitler's overtures.

By May 1936, the conquest of Abyssinia was complete. The League abandoned its sanctions in July — a humiliating public admission that collective security had failed. The consequences were catastrophic for the League's credibility: not only had an aggressor successfully conquered a fellow League member, but the organisation's most powerful members had been exposed as prioritising self-interest over international law. This emboldened Hitler, who remilitarised the Rhineland in March 1936 (while the Abyssinian crisis was ongoing) with no response from France or Britain. The League of Nations, though it formally continued to exist, had ceased to function as a peacekeeping body.

Mark Scheme (16 marks + 4 SPaG = 20 total): Level 4 (13–16): Sustained analysis of multiple factors with consistent argument; judgement clearly maintained throughout; strong factual support; evaluates relative importance of factors.

Grade 9 Essay Plan:

Introduction: Agree that self-interest was a critical factor, but argue it was not the most fundamental — the structural absence of the USA and the impact of the Great Depression created conditions in which self-interest became irresistible and the League structurally incapable.

Paragraph 1 — FOR (Self-interest was major): Over Manchuria, Britain and France refused sanctions to protect Asian trade. Over Abyssinia, they excluded oil from sanctions to retain Mussolini as an ally against Hitler. The Hoare-Laval Pact shows they were actively willing to betray League principles in secret. The Stresa Front (April 1935) shows they prioritised the anti-German alliance over collective security against Italy. Without self-interest, sanctions might have worked.

Paragraph 2 — AGAINST (Depression was arguably more fundamental): The Depression created the economic desperation that drove Japanese and Italian aggression in the first place. It also made sanctions politically toxic — countries needed any trade available. Without the Depression, the League might have weathered self-interest, as it largely did in the 1920s when economies were growing.

Paragraph 3 — AGAINST (Structural weakness — USA absent): Even if Britain and France had acted perfectly, without American economic power, military strength, and oil sanctions, the League could never have stopped Japan or Italy. The USA sold oil to Italy throughout the Abyssinian Crisis. The League's structural reliance on Britain and France as its sole enforcers meant any failure of their will was fatal. This was a design flaw from 1919, not simply a 1930s failure.

Paragraph 4 — COUNTER-ARGUMENT SYNTHESIS: Self-interest and structural weakness interacted: the structural absence of the USA made Britain and France's self-interest more damaging, because there was no alternative enforcer. And the Depression amplified self-interest, making politicians unwilling to impose costly sanctions. The failures were therefore cumulative, not reducible to one cause.

Conclusion: Self-interest was a highly significant cause — the Hoare-Laval Pact in particular was a deliberate, conscious betrayal that could have been avoided. However, the most fundamental reason for failure was the structural absence of the USA, which meant the League depended entirely on Britain and France's goodwill. When the Depression removed the economic and political conditions for collective sacrifice, structural dependence on self-interested great powers proved fatal. Self-interest was therefore the most visible cause, but structural design was the most fundamental.