Hitler's Foreign Policy 1933–1938

Mark scheme (4 marks — 2 marks per inference: 1 for inference + 1 for supporting detail from source):

Inference 1: We can infer that Hitler had already decided to use military force to achieve Germany's expansion by 1937. Supporting detail: He states "Germany's problem can only be solved by means of force" — showing military aggression was a deliberate policy, not a last resort.

Inference 2: We can infer that Austria and Czechoslovakia were Hitler's specific first targets for military conquest. Supporting detail: He states the "first objective" would be to "overthrow Czechoslovakia and Austria simultaneously" — revealing pre-planned aggression against specific states.

Note: Do not simply describe what the source says — you must make an inference (reading between the lines).

Mark scheme (8 marks — levels-based):

Level 4 (7–8 marks): Analyses utility of both sources using NOP with contextual knowledge; explains that sources can be useful despite limitations; reaches a supported judgement on relative utility.

Sample answer structure:

Source A is useful because Chamberlain, as British PM and the key negotiator at Munich, has direct first-hand knowledge of British policy. His speech reveals the genuine political reasons for appeasement — the belief that Hitler's demands were legitimate under self-determination, and that negotiation was preferable to war. For a historian studying British responses, this is invaluable primary evidence. However, Source A is limited because it is a public speech designed to justify a controversial policy to Parliament — Chamberlain would not reveal doubts or the pressure he faced. His diary shows greater private anxiety.

Source B is highly useful because as a private military briefing, it reveals Hitler's real intentions without public posturing. Its private nature makes it more credible — Hitler had no reason to inflate his aggression for foreign consumption. It directly shows that German aggression was premeditated, supporting the intentionalist interpretation. However, structuralist historians argue Hitler may have been posturing for his generals, and the actual 1943–45 deadline was never met — war began in 1939.

Overall: Both sources are useful together — Source A shows British willingness to appease; Source B shows Hitler was already planning to exploit that weakness. Used alongside contextual knowledge of the Munich negotiations, they provide a strong picture of the crisis.

Mark scheme (8 marks — levels-based):

Level 4 (7–8 marks): Accurate, detailed narrative with analysis of how events link together to explain the outcome; clear causal structure.

Model answer:

The Munich Agreement was the product of a carefully orchestrated crisis that exploited both genuine ethnic tensions and Western fears of another war.

Following the Anschluss of March 1938, Hitler immediately targeted Czechoslovakia, which now lay surrounded on three sides by Germany. He directed Konrad Henlein, leader of the Sudeten Nazi Party, to make demands of the Czech government that could never be satisfied — each time the Czechs offered concessions, Henlein raised his demands. By May 1938, Europe was on the brink of war as German troops massed on the Czech border.

British PM Neville Chamberlain, determined to avoid war at almost any cost, flew personally to meet Hitler at Berchtesgaden (15 September 1938), where Hitler demanded the Sudetenland immediately. Chamberlain persuaded the French and pressured the Czechs to accept the loss of territories where over 50% were German. When Chamberlain returned to Germany at Godesberg (22 September), Hitler raised his demands further — he now wanted immediate military occupation. War seemed inevitable.

At this critical moment, Mussolini proposed a four-power conference. Meeting in Munich on 29–30 September, Britain, France, Italy, and Germany agreed to hand the Sudetenland to Germany at once. Czechoslovakia — the country whose territory was being divided — was not invited and was told to accept or face Hitler alone. Chamberlain returned to London declaring "peace for our time."

The key causal link between these events was appeasement: each British concession convinced Hitler that the Western powers would not fight, which emboldened him to demand more. The Anschluss had shown that territorial expansion faced no military resistance; the Sudeten crisis confirmed this. Munich was thus both the peak of appeasement and the moment that made further German aggression — and ultimately war — inevitable.

Mark scheme (16 marks — levels-based, including 4 SPaG marks):

Level 4 (13–16 marks): Sustained analytical argument; considers multiple factors; reaches a well-supported, balanced judgement; excellent SPaG.

Essay plan:

Agree — Hitler's ambitions were the main cause:
• Mein Kampf (1925) and the Hossbach Memorandum (1937) show consistent, premeditated expansionist plans
• Hitler actively provoked each crisis — encouraged Henlein, pressured Schuschnigg, ordered troop movements
• His goals went far beyond Versailles revision — Lebensraum required conquering the USSR, unrelated to 1919
• Without Hitler's specific ideology and decisions, there is no logical path from Versailles to world war

Disagree — Other factors were significant:
• Treaty of Versailles created genuine grievances; even many non-Nazi Germans resented it; gave Hitler legitimate-sounding cover
• British and French appeasement directly enabled Hitler — the Rhineland was his "greatest gamble" and he would have retreated if challenged
• Weakness of the League of Nations meant no collective security to deter aggression
• The Great Depression destabilised democracies and funded extremism
• USA isolationism removed the key counterweight to German power

Synthesis/Judgement:
Hitler's ambitions were the necessary cause — without them, the other factors would not have led to war. Versailles created grievances that many German politicians shared, but the Weimar Republic was working within the international system. The Depression created conditions that extremism exploited, but Hitler made the specific choice to use war rather than diplomacy. Appeasement and League weakness were enabling conditions rather than root causes. The Hossbach Memorandum's evidence that Hitler planned war by 1943–45 at the latest — regardless of diplomatic circumstances — strongly supports Hitler's ambitions as the primary cause, though his ability to act depended on the failure of collective security and the policy of appeasement.

SPaG advice: Use paragraphing, varied vocabulary (avoid repeating "Hitler wanted to"), accurate historical terminology (Lebensraum, appeasement, collective security), and a clear introduction/conclusion.