Appeasement and the Outbreak of War 1938–1939
- Explain the reasons why Britain followed a policy of appeasement
- Describe the events of the Munich Agreement, September 1938
- Analyse the significance of the Nazi-Soviet Pact, August 1939
- Evaluate the arguments for and against appeasement as a policy
- Assess the main reasons for the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939
📜 Historical Context
By 1938, Europe stood at a crossroads. Adolf Hitler's Germany had been re-arming since 1935, remilitarising the Rhineland in 1936, and absorbing Austria in March 1938 (Anschluss). The democratic powers — Britain and France — faced a stark choice: confront Hitler militarily or negotiate. Their chosen path, appeasement, would define the final year of peace and bring the continent to war by September 1939. For GCSE History, understanding the logic behind appeasement, its failure, and the chain of events that produced the Second World War is essential for both source questions and essay writing.
Key Dates Timeline
The chain of events from Munich to war took less than twelve months. The critical turning point was 15 March 1939: until that date, many British politicians genuinely believed Hitler's territorial demands were about correcting the injustices of Versailles. After that date, it was clear Hitler wanted European domination, not just German self-determination. Every exam question on "why did WW2 break out?" must address this shift.
The Chain of Events Leading to War
Sept 1938
Appeasement rewarded
Mar 1939
Mar 1939
Aug 1939
1 Sept 1939
3 Sept 1939
🔑 Core Content
What Was Appeasement?
Appeasement was the British (and French) foreign policy of making concessions to Hitler in order to avoid war. Rather than challenging Germany's increasingly aggressive actions, the British government — led by Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain from May 1937 — chose to negotiate, believing that satisfying Hitler's "reasonable" demands would secure lasting peace. The policy was not accidental or cowardly: it was a deliberate, calculated strategy based on several powerful arguments.
Reasons Why Britain Adopted Appeasement
The First World War (1914–18) had killed nearly 900,000 British soldiers and left millions scarred. By the late 1930s, military planners estimated that a new war with modern bombers would kill 600,000 British civilians within weeks. Chamberlain genuinely believed that preventing war at almost any cost was a moral duty. Public opinion overwhelmingly supported peace: in the 1935 "Peace Ballot," 11.5 million Britons voted for collective disarmament.
Britain's armed forces were not ready for war in 1938. The RAF had only recently begun to rearm with Spitfires and Hurricanes; the army lacked modern tanks and equipment. Chief of the Imperial General Staff Lord Gort and the Chiefs of Staff advised Chamberlain that Britain could not win a war against Germany in 1938. Appeasement therefore bought time: by September 1939, the RAF had significantly more modern fighters than it would have had in 1938.
Many British politicians, including Chamberlain, believed the Treaty of Versailles (1919) had treated Germany unjustly. The "war guilt" clause (Article 231), reparations of £6.6 billion, and the separation of ethnic Germans into other countries seemed unfair. When Hitler demanded the Sudetenland — home to 3 million German speakers — many British people saw it as a legitimate claim. Giving Hitler what he "deserved" seemed just, not weak.
Many British conservatives viewed Nazi Germany as a bulwark against Soviet communism. Hitler's virulent anti-communism made him seem, to some, a useful counterweight to Stalin's USSR. A weakened Germany might leave the door open to communist revolution spreading westward. Chamberlain and others were reluctant to weaken Hitler too much for this reason.
The British public was overwhelmingly opposed to another war. The Great Depression of the 1930s had created mass unemployment (over 3 million by 1933) and Britain could not afford a major rearmament programme without damaging the economic recovery. Chamberlain faced enormous pressure from the press and public to pursue peace. A government that led Britain into another war risked electoral catastrophe.
The Munich Agreement — September 1938
The crisis over the Sudetenland brought Europe to the brink of war. Hitler demanded that the predominantly German-speaking Sudetenland region of Czechoslovakia be transferred to Germany. Czechoslovakia refused. Hitler threatened military action. Chamberlain flew to Germany three times in September 1938 to negotiate.
On 29–30 September 1938, a four-power conference was held in Munich between Britain (Chamberlain), France (Daladier), Germany (Hitler), and Italy (Mussolini). Czechoslovakia was not invited. The agreement transferred the Sudetenland to Germany immediately, with Britain and France guaranteeing the remainder of Czech territory. In return, Hitler signed an Anglo-German declaration pledging to resolve future disputes peacefully.
Chamberlain returned to Britain to a hero's welcome, waving the piece of paper and declaring: "I believe it is peace for our time." He genuinely believed he had averted war and forced Hitler into a framework of negotiation.
Many students write that Chamberlain "naively trusted Hitler." This misreads the situation. Chamberlain was a calculating politician who knew he was buying time for British rearmament. His private diaries show he was deeply suspicious of Hitler but believed war in 1938 would be catastrophic for Britain. The strategic calculation — delay now, fight later from a stronger position — was rational, even if ultimately unsuccessful.
Hitler Breaks the Munich Agreement — March 1939
On 15 March 1939, German troops marched into Prague and occupied the rest of Czechoslovakia — territory that was overwhelmingly Czech-speaking, not German. Hitler had explicitly promised at Munich that the Sudetenland was his "last territorial demand in Europe." This invasion was indefensible even by the logic of self-determination and national grievances. It proved that Hitler's ambitions went far beyond correcting Versailles injustices; he sought domination of Europe.
Public opinion in Britain shifted dramatically. Newspapers that had praised Munich now condemned Hitler. Chamberlain himself felt personally betrayed. Within weeks, on 31 March 1939, Britain and France issued a guarantee to Poland: if Poland were attacked and resisted, Britain would declare war on Germany. This was a fundamental reversal of the appeasement strategy.
Britain's Guarantee to Poland — March 1939
The Polish guarantee was a dramatic policy shift. Britain committed itself to defending a country it could not easily reach geographically, with an army that was still rearming, against a Germany that had just absorbed Czechoslovakia's formidable arms industry (the Skoda works). Critics such as Churchill argued the guarantee was strategically weak without an alliance with the Soviet Union. However, it sent a clear signal: Britain would no longer acquiesce to German aggression.
Polish Foreign Minister Józef Beck accepted the guarantee but also refused to allow Soviet troops onto Polish soil — a fatal obstacle to building an effective anti-German coalition, since the USSR shared a border with Germany only through Poland.
The Nazi-Soviet Pact — August 1939
The Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact, signed in Moscow on 23 August 1939 by Foreign Ministers Joachim von Ribbentrop and Vyacheslav Molotov, shocked the world. Ideologically, Nazi Germany and Soviet communism were bitter enemies — yet they agreed not to attack each other. A secret protocol divided Eastern Europe into spheres of influence: Germany would take western Poland; the USSR would take eastern Poland, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and Bessarabia.
The Pact was the most direct immediate cause of the Second World War. It meant Hitler could invade Poland without fear of a simultaneous Soviet attack from the east — eliminating the dreaded two-front war. Without the Pact, Hitler might have delayed his attack on Poland. For Stalin, it offered time to rearm while Germany fought the Western powers. Both dictators believed they were outwitting the other — and both were right, temporarily.
Why did Stalin sign? Britain and France had been negotiating with the USSR throughout summer 1939, but talks moved slowly. The Western powers were reluctant to give Stalin a free hand in Eastern Europe, and Poland refused Soviet troops on its territory. Stalin concluded that the Western powers might allow Hitler to attack the USSR just as they had allowed him to absorb Czechoslovakia. The Pact seemed to offer security and territorial gains at low risk.
The Invasion of Poland and Declaration of War — September 1939
On 1 September 1939, Germany invaded Poland from the west, north, and south with 1.5 million troops supported by 2,700 tanks and 2,000 aircraft. The Soviet Union invaded from the east on 17 September. Poland was crushed in weeks.
Britain issued an ultimatum to Germany on 1 September: withdraw from Poland or Britain would declare war. Germany ignored it. At 11:00 AM on 3 September 1939, Chamberlain announced on BBC Radio that Britain was at war with Germany. France followed hours later. The Second World War had begun.
Key Figures
British Prime Minister May 1937 – May 1940. The architect of appeasement. Flew to Germany three times in September 1938 to negotiate with Hitler. Declared "peace for our time" after Munich. After March 1939, reversed course and guaranteed Poland. Resigned May 1940, replaced by Winston Churchill.
Conservative MP and the most prominent critic of appeasement throughout the 1930s. Described the Munich Agreement as "a total and unmitigated defeat." Argued Britain should have challenged Hitler earlier and sought an alliance with the USSR. Became Prime Minister on 10 May 1940. His warnings proved prophetic, though his alternative strategy had its own difficulties.
Leader of the Soviet Union. Distrustful of Britain and France after they excluded the USSR from the Munich Conference. Signed the Nazi-Soviet Pact to protect Soviet interests and gain territory in Eastern Europe. His decision to ally with Hitler was the immediate trigger for the invasion of Poland and thus the outbreak of war.
Nazi Germany's Foreign Minister from 1938. Negotiated the Nazi-Soviet Pact with Molotov in Moscow on 23 August 1939. A fanatical Nazi who advocated aggressive expansion. Executed at Nuremberg in 1946 for war crimes.
Polish Foreign Minister 1932–39. Accepted Britain's guarantee in March 1939 but refused to allow Soviet troops into Poland, making a full anti-German alliance impossible. Beck misjudged the threat from both Germany and the USSR. Poland was invaded by both powers in September 1939.
Conceptual Overview
- Fear of another war
- Military unpreparedness
- Sympathy for Versailles grievances
- Fear of communism
- Public opinion / economy
- Sudetenland given to Hitler
- Czechoslovakia excluded
- "Peace for our time"
- Chamberlain's calculation
- March 1939 occupation
- Hitler breaks promise
- Guarantee to Poland
- Policy reversed
- Signed 23 Aug 1939
- Ribbentrop & Molotov
- Secret protocol
- Removes two-front fear
- Invasion of Poland 1 Sept
- British ultimatum ignored
- War declared 3 Sept
- Responsibility debate
🔍 Analysis & Evaluation
Cause-Consequence Chain — From Appeasement to War
Was Appeasement the Right Policy? — Arguments For and Against
| Arguments FOR Appeasement | Arguments AGAINST Appeasement |
|---|---|
| Britain was not militarily ready in 1938; appeasement bought vital time for rearmament | Appeasement encouraged Hitler — each concession made him more aggressive, not less |
| The Versailles treaty had genuine injustices; Germany's grievances had some merit | March 1939 showed Hitler's aims went beyond Versailles — he was after domination, not justice |
| Public opinion in Britain was firmly against war in 1938; a democratic government had to reflect this | By yielding, Britain and France betrayed Czechoslovakia and weakened collective security |
| British economic weakness made a costly war extremely dangerous for social stability | Germany gained Czechoslovakia's Skoda arms factories — actually strengthened Hitler militarily |
| Chamberlain preserved the option of war for a time when Britain would be stronger | Churchill argued earlier confrontation (e.g., Rhineland 1936) could have stopped Hitler at lower cost |
Who Was Most Responsible for World War Two?
| Figure | Responsibility | Evaluation |
|---|---|---|
| Hitler | Planned and ordered every act of aggression; set the agenda for war | Most responsible — without Hitler's deliberate policy of expansion, no war in 1939 |
| Chamberlain | Appeasement gave Hitler confidence; Munich directly enabled invasion of Czechoslovakia | Significantly responsible but acted in good faith with limited options; also reversed policy in 1939 |
| Stalin | Nazi-Soviet Pact was the most direct immediate trigger; gave Hitler green light for Poland | Highly responsible for timing; without the Pact, Hitler might have delayed or been deterred |
| The League of Nations / Versailles peacemakers | Failed to create durable peace; Versailles created resentments Hitler exploited | Background cause — set the conditions but did not make war inevitable |
Fear of another war | Unpreparedness of the military | Misplaced sympathy for Versailles grievances | Economy / public opinion against war | Stronghold against communism
And for the causes of WW2: HANDS — Hitler's aggression | Appeasement encouraging him | Nazi-Soviet Pact | Democracies' weakness | Sudetenland/Munich failure
Four Key Factors — Revision Grid
- Hitler's long-term ambition (Mein Kampf, 1925)
- Appeasement emboldened German aggression
- Nazi-Soviet Pact removed restraint on Hitler
- Failure of collective security / League
- Unresolved Versailles grievances
- Czechoslovakia destroyed without British support
- Germany absorbed Skoda arms factories
- Hitler concluded Britain would not fight
- Britain bought 12 months of rearmament time
- RAF had more Spitfires/Hurricanes by Sept 1939
- Eliminated Hitler's fear of a two-front war
- Allowed invasion of Poland to proceed
- Shocked the world — ideological enemies allied
- Secret protocol carved up Eastern Europe
- USSR gained time to rearm (until 1941)
- Distinguish short-term vs long-term causes
- Evaluate appeasement as reasonable vs disastrous
- Link Nazi-Soviet Pact to the invasion of Poland
- Compare responsibility: Hitler vs Chamberlain vs Stalin
- Support judgements with specific factual evidence
🔎 Source Analysis
Nature — what type of source is it? (speech, cartoon, photograph, diary, newspaper)
Origin — who created it, when, and in what context?
Purpose — why was it created? What effect was intended?
Always link NOP back to the question: does the origin/purpose make the source more or less useful? A source can be biased yet still highly useful as evidence of what someone believed or wanted others to believe.
"The settlement of the Czechoslovakian problem which has now been achieved is, in my view, only the prelude to a larger settlement in which all Europe may find peace. This morning I had another talk with the German Chancellor, Herr Hitler, and here is the paper which bears his name upon it as well as mine... We regard the agreement signed last night and the Anglo-German Naval Agreement as symbolic of the desire of our two peoples never to go to war with one another again."
❓ Exam Practice Questions
Give two things you can infer from Source A (Chamberlain's speech at Heston Aerodrome, 30 September 1938) about why Chamberlain believed appeasement had succeeded.
Mark Scheme (2 × 2 marks):
Inference 1: Chamberlain believed the agreement would lead to broader European peace. [I] He says the Czechoslovakia settlement is "only the prelude to a larger settlement in which all Europe may find peace." [E]
Inference 2: Chamberlain believed he had secured a personal commitment from Hitler. [I] He refers to "a paper which bears his name upon it as well as mine," suggesting he trusted Hitler's signature as a guarantee. [E]
Award 1 mark for the inference and 1 mark for selecting supporting detail from the source. Do not award marks for simple description.
How useful is Source B (the Daily Express cartoon, October 1938) for a historian studying whether appeasement was a successful policy? Explain your answer using Source B and your own knowledge.
Mark Scheme guidance:
Content (what it shows): The cartoon is useful because it shows that even in October 1938, before Hitler broke Munich in March 1939, some British commentators viewed appeasement as a pattern of dangerous concessions rather than a success. It depicts Chamberlain actively handing Czechoslovakia to Hitler, who has already accumulated the Rhineland, Austria, and Memel — suggesting appeasement was escalating, not resolving, aggression.
Provenance (NOP): The source was created by a cartoonist for the Daily Express in October 1938 to criticise government policy. Its purpose is satirical — to shift opinion against appeasement — so it deliberately exaggerates. This limits its reliability as a factual account but increases its usefulness as evidence of contemporary criticism of appeasement.
Own knowledge: The cartoon is supported by events: Hitler did continue to make demands after Munich. By March 1939 he had occupied the rest of Czechoslovakia, proving the cartoon's implication correct. However, in October 1938 most British people still supported Munich (shown by Chamberlain's initial hero's welcome), so the cartoon represents a minority view at that time.
Conclusion: The source is useful for understanding that appeasement was contested even immediately after Munich, but it has limitations as a biased, one-sided satirical piece that does not reflect the majority view at the time.
Write a narrative account analysing the events that led to the outbreak of the Second World War in September 1939. You could mention the Munich Agreement and the Nazi-Soviet Pact, as well as using your own knowledge.
Mark Scheme guidance (aim for L3 — complex narrative):
A strong answer links events in a causal chain, not just a chronological list.
Model answer points: In September 1938, Britain and France signed the Munich Agreement, granting Hitler the Sudetenland in exchange for his promise this was his "last territorial demand." This encouraged Hitler: it demonstrated the democracies would concede rather than fight. On 15 March 1939, Hitler occupied the rest of Czechoslovakia, breaking Munich entirely and proving that appeasement had failed to restrain him. In response, Britain issued a guarantee to Poland (31 March 1939), committing to war if Poland were attacked — a fundamental reversal of policy. Meanwhile, Hitler needed to avoid a two-front war. The Nazi-Soviet Pact (23 August 1939) solved this problem: Stalin agreed not to attack Germany, and in return received the eastern half of Poland. This gave Hitler the confidence to order the invasion of Poland on 1 September 1939. When Germany ignored the British ultimatum, Britain and France declared war on 3 September 1939. The key causal link is that appeasement emboldened Hitler, the Nazi-Soviet Pact removed the final obstacle, and the British guarantee to Poland meant war was unavoidable once Poland was invaded.
Explain why Britain adopted a policy of appeasement in the 1930s. You could mention the memory of the First World War and Britain's military unpreparedness, as well as using your own knowledge.
Mark Scheme guidance (aim for L3 — explains with detail and analysis):
Point 1 — Fear of war: The First World War had killed 900,000 British soldiers and devastated a generation. By the 1930s, military planners warned that modern bombers could kill 600,000 civilians in weeks. Chamberlain, who had experienced the Great War, was determined to prevent another catastrophe. The 1935 Peace Ballot (11.5 million votes for disarmament) showed how deeply the public shared this fear.
Point 2 — Military unpreparedness: In 1938, Britain's Chiefs of Staff advised that Britain was not ready for war. The RAF lacked modern fighters in sufficient numbers; the army was under-equipped. Appeasement bought approximately twelve months of rearmament time — by September 1939, Britain had significantly more Spitfires and Hurricanes than it would have had in 1938.
Point 3 — Sympathy for Versailles grievances: Many British politicians believed the 1919 Treaty had been too harsh on Germany. When Hitler demanded the Sudetenland (home to 3 million German speakers), many saw it as a legitimate national self-determination claim rather than dangerous aggression.
Point 4 — Anti-communism: Some conservatives saw Germany as a barrier against Soviet communism spreading westward, making them reluctant to weaken Hitler too severely.
"The Nazi-Soviet Pact was the main reason for the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939." How far do you agree with this statement? Explain your answer.
Mark Scheme guidance (aim for L4 — argues, evaluates, reaches a supported judgement):
A Grade 9 answer must: argue a clear line; support arguments with specific evidence; consider the alternative interpretation seriously; reach a justified conclusion explaining which factor was most important and why.
See Section 7 for a full model answer.
⭐ Grade 9 Model Answers
There is a strong case that the Nazi-Soviet Pact was the most important immediate cause of the Second World War. Signed on 23 August 1939, the Pact between Hitler and Stalin — formalised by their foreign ministers Ribbentrop and Molotov — removed Hitler's single greatest strategic fear: fighting a simultaneous war on two fronts. In 1918, Germany had been forced to fight both Britain and France in the west and Russia in the east; this had been a major cause of her defeat. By guaranteeing Soviet neutrality, the Pact allowed Hitler to invade Poland on 1 September 1939 with confidence that he would not face a Soviet attack from the east. Without it, Hitler may well have delayed or deterred his attack on Poland, since even he acknowledged that Germany could not risk another two-front war. The Pact also contained a secret protocol that divided Eastern Europe into German and Soviet spheres of influence, meaning Stalin actively encouraged the invasion of Poland in order to claim his share. The Pact was therefore not merely a background condition but the specific event that made the invasion of Poland possible and thus directly caused the outbreak of war.
However, appeasement can be argued to have been an equally significant cause because it created the conditions in which the Nazi-Soviet Pact became possible. The Munich Agreement of September 1938, in which Britain and France granted Hitler the Sudetenland without consulting Czechoslovakia, demonstrated to both Hitler and Stalin that the Western powers would not resist German aggression. For Hitler, Munich showed that Britain and France lacked the will to fight; this emboldened him to proceed with further expansion. For Stalin, it demonstrated that the Western democracies might allow Hitler to expand eastward, potentially at the USSR's expense — exactly as Churchill warned. This convinced Stalin that a deal with Hitler, rather than a collective security agreement with Britain and France, offered the best protection for the Soviet Union. Crucially, therefore, it was appeasement at Munich that drove Stalin into Hitler's arms: without Munich, Stalin might have maintained the Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations of summer 1939, which could have produced an anti-German alliance strong enough to deter the invasion of Poland. In this sense, appeasement was the deeper cause that made the Nazi-Soviet Pact both likely and necessary from Stalin's perspective.
Yet both appeasement and the Nazi-Soviet Pact were ultimately responses to the fundamental long-term cause of the war: Hitler's deliberate, ideologically-driven policy of German expansion. As early as 1925, in Mein Kampf, Hitler had outlined his intention to create living space (Lebensraum) for the German people at the expense of Slavic peoples in the east. Every act of aggression from the remilitarisation of the Rhineland (1936) to the annexation of Austria (March 1938) to the occupation of Czechoslovakia (March 1939) flowed from this programme. Appeasement was a reaction to Hitler's aggression, not its cause; and the Nazi-Soviet Pact was a means to an end — the conquest of Poland — that Hitler had planned long before August 1939. It is therefore difficult to argue that either appeasement or the Pact was truly the "main" cause of the war; both were secondary causes behind the primary driver of Hitler's expansionist ideology and decisions.
In conclusion, whilst the Nazi-Soviet Pact was the most important short-term cause of the Second World War — it was the specific event that unlocked Hitler's invasion of Poland — it was not the main cause overall. Appeasement was a more significant underlying cause because it both emboldened Hitler and convinced Stalin that an alliance with Germany was preferable to one with Britain. Above all, however, Hitler's long-term ideological ambition for German domination of Europe was the fundamental cause without which neither appeasement nor the Pact would have mattered. I would therefore argue that Hitler's aggression was the main reason for the outbreak of war, with the Nazi-Soviet Pact as the decisive immediate trigger and appeasement as the critical enabling factor that made both possible.
- Argues a clear line from the opening — doesn't just list factors
- Specific evidence in every paragraph (dates, names, facts from Mein Kampf)
- Genuinely evaluates the relative importance of each factor, not just describes it
- Links factors to each other (appeasement → Pact → invasion)
- Conclusion is substantiated — the judgement is explained, not just stated
- Considers both sides of the debate without sitting on the fence
📋 Revision Summary
| Date | Event | Significance |
|---|---|---|
| Sept 1938 | Munich Agreement | Sudetenland ceded; "peace for our time" |
| Mar 1939 | Czechoslovakia occupied | Munich broken; appeasement fails |
| Mar 1939 | Guarantee to Poland | Policy reversed; Britain commits to war |
| 23 Aug 1939 | Nazi-Soviet Pact | Hitler free to invade Poland |
| 1 Sept 1939 | Poland invaded | WW2 begins |
| 3 Sept 1939 | Britain/France declare war | WW2 confirmed |
| Person | Role | Key Fact |
|---|---|---|
| Chamberlain | British PM | "Peace for our time" — Munich 1938 |
| Churchill | Critic of appeasement | "Total and unmitigated defeat" |
| Stalin | Soviet leader | Signed Nazi-Soviet Pact Aug 1939 |
| Ribbentrop | Nazi Foreign Minister | Signed Pact with Molotov |
| Beck | Polish FM | Refused Soviet troops; accepted British guarantee |
| Term | Definition |
|---|---|
| Appeasement | Making concessions to aggressive powers to avoid war |
| Sudetenland | German-speaking region of Czechoslovakia given to Hitler at Munich |
| Nazi-Soviet Pact | Non-aggression agreement between Germany and USSR, August 1939 |
| Lebensraum | "Living space" — Hitler's goal of eastern European conquest |
| Blitzkrieg | "Lightning war" — rapid German military tactic used against Poland |
| Collective security | Principle that nations cooperate to resist aggression together |
- For 4-mark source inference: state the inference AND quote the evidence
- For 8-mark utility: use NOP AND at least two pieces of own knowledge
- For 8-mark narrative: link events in a causal chain, not a list
- For 12-mark explain: three PEE paragraphs; prioritise your most important factor
- For 16-mark essay: argue both sides; reach a clear, evidenced judgement
- Always give specific dates, names, and statistics — not vague generalisations
🔄 Flashcards
Click a card to flip it and reveal the answer.
✅ I Can...
- I can explain at least five reasons why Britain adopted appeasement in the 1930s
- I can describe what happened at the Munich Conference in September 1938
- I can explain why Czechoslovakia was not invited to Munich
- I can evaluate Chamberlain's "peace for our time" claim with evidence
- I can explain why Hitler's occupation of Czechoslovakia in March 1939 was a turning point
- I can describe the terms and significance of the Nazi-Soviet Pact
- I can explain why Stalin signed the Pact with Hitler
- I can describe the events of September 1939 leading to Britain declaring war
- I can compare the responsibility of Hitler, Chamberlain, and Stalin for WW2
- I can use the NOP technique to analyse the utility of a historical source
- I can write a 16-mark essay with a structured argument, evidence, and supported judgement
- I can use FUMES to recall the reasons for appeasement under exam conditions